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Introduction
For over twenty five years, Malaysia has prospered. Economic growth, measured by GDP, has averaged over 7% per annum since independence in 1957. By 1994, despite having a population of only 19 million people, Malaysia had become the world's nineteenth largest trading nation.
Its economic strength was formerly based on commodities such as rubber, timber and palm oil. For a time in the mid-1980s, growth was affected by the global recession and structural weaknesses in the domestic economy. However, industrialisation has accelerated in recent years; the average increase in GDP has been in excess of 8% per annum between 1988 and 1994. The country is now one of the hubs of the global electronics industry and it also manufactures a wide range of other goods. Commodity-based industries are moving into value-added manufacturing activities such as furniture, food and chemicals.
A series of Five-Year Plans have been implemented. The most recent (the sixth, covering the period 1991-5) committed the government, historically a major employer, to a strategy of growth led by the private sector. An extensive privatisation programme has been set in train, inward foreign investment is being attracted, and capital-and technology-intensive industries are encouraged.
In this environment, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) have the potential to play a crucial role in supporting balanced growth across the economy (Bannock and Albach, 1991) . The development of a small firm sector can assist in the transition from developing to developed country; the experience of Japan and other newly industrialised countries in Asia seems to suggest that a modern SME sector is a necessary condition for sustained and accelerated development.
The importance of SMEs has been increasingly recognised in Malaysia (Chee, 1992) ; indeed, the sector began to enjoy positive discrimination relative to large companies by the late 1980s (Fong, 1990) .
One area of particular concern has been the availability of funds for SMEs.
Access to finance (rather than its cost) has long been identified as a major problem (Chee, 1986) . While the range of funding options available has undoubtedly widened over the past two decades, the financial system remains primarily debt-oriented. High levels of debt are not normally appropriate for companies with a high degree of risk, but with the potential for rapid growth. In these circumstances, venture capital can fill an important gap in the financial intermediation process. Venture fund managers seek out and nurture high growth companies, which are frequently refused finance from conventional sources, hence venture capital can be an important catalyst to entrepreneurship and economic growth (Ray, 1993) . Venture capital could therefore assist the development of the SME sector in Malaysia, which in turn is crucial to the continuing prosperity of the economy.
By the summer of 1994, the venture capital industry had been in operation in Malaysia for a decade. Despite its capacity to play a crucial role in economic development, however, the industry has not been subject to independent empirical review. This article attempts to fills that gap. Interviews based on a semi-structured set of questions were conducted with senior officials of 10 venture funds. Only 14 funds are operating in Malaysia; this article therefore represents the views of a substantial majority of the venture capital community.
The article is structured as follows. The next section assesses the role of venture capital in developing countries, describes the development of the industry in Malaysia and sets out the incentives offered by the government. The following section, drawing on the views of survey participants, gives some general information on their investment policies and practices. The impact of government policy is then explored, and the constraints and opportunities facing the sector are summarised. The final section considers the implications of the findings for official attempts to promote venture capital in other developing countries.
Venture Capital in Malaysia
The potential role of venture capital
The financial system serving the needs of SMEs in Malaysia is primarily debtoriented and combines both private and public sector financial institutions. In the private sector, the commercial banks and other financial institutions have aggressively sought lending opportunities in the small business sector. The value of credit facilities extended by the core banking system -commercial banks and finance companies -to small scale enterprises had reached RM9.8bn
1 by the end of 1992 (Bank Negara, 1993) . SMEs also have access to funding from a number other sources, including publicly-backed development finance institutions and private leasing and factoring companies. Outstanding credit facilities to small firms from outside the core banking system are thought to be around RM9-10bn (Lin, 1994) .
However, SMEs across the globe experience difficulties in raising external funding, especially bank finance. These difficulties stem from a variety of interlinked factors. The risk of failure for SMEs is traditionally higher than that of larger firms, especially in the early years of operation. This problem is compounded by information asymmetries which hinder lenders in their efforts to identify sound borrowers. As a result, it is rarely feasible for lenders to compensate for the risks inherent in an SME lending portfolio by adjusting the interest rate for individual companies (Greenwald, Weiss et al., 1984; Weiss and Stiglitz, 1981) . Furthermore, advances to SMEs need to be carefully appraised to ensure that the borrowers use the funds effectively (the moral hazard problem); the costs of the initial assessment, and the ongoing monitoring, are usually very high relative to the amount requested.
Venture capital, by contrast, is typically associated with equity or equity-linked financing instruments. Such investments are unsecured. As a consequence, venture fund managers take a much more direct involvement in the business than 1 RM = Malaysian Ringgitt. The rate of exchange at that time was approximately RM4 to £1.
banks and other debt providers. In return, they have the opportunity to share in the success of the companies invested in when the shares are subsequently sold, for example after the investee company achieves a stock market quotation.
In certain circumstances, information asymmetries may also cause difficulties for equity markets (Davis, 1992: 8) . In general, however, the substitution of venture capital for debt should help to overcome some of the problems associated with debt and offer a more appropriate method of funding high risk SMEs.
In the early years of its development in the United States, venture capital was closely associated with the early-stage financing of companies dealing with advanced technology. The economic importance of new technology based firms has been recognised; they make a key contribution to the efficiency of research and development, economic growth and employment (Rothwell, 1989 It is the emergence of a somewhat broader spectrum of investment choices that makes venture capital such an attractive option for policy-makers attempting to tackle the financial problems faced by SMEs in emerging economies (Sagari & Guidotti, 1991) . Venture capital may not, however, be suitable for all developing countries. Investment opportunities may be restricted by poor prospects for economic growth, an economy which stifles entrepreneurial activity, or a lack of divestment avenues (Ibanez, 1989 On the demand side, the buoyant domestic economy and the availability of government incentives have created opportunities for SMEs to thrive. In addition, an influx of multinationals require the services of local sub-contractors to supply specialised services, parts and components. As a result, the population of SMEs is now estimated at more than 300,000 (New Straits Times, 11 June 1994).
Nevertheless, the SME sector remains 'very fragmented and characterised by a lack of product differentiation and appropriate technology' (Bank Negara, 1992) .
SMEs have gradually become more aware of the benefits of venture capital as an alternative source of finance. Increased awareness may also have 'spilled over' from venture capital activity in Singapore and from the recent growth in Islamic banking, which contains many of the features of venture capital (Boocock and Presley, 1993 As a result of the interaction of these demand and supply factors, the number of venture funds has increased rapidly over recent years (see Table 1 ). The figures in Table 1 cover only investments made by funds based in Malaysia. It is known that venture capitalists from outside the country have also made modest investments. Overall, the amounts invested by venture capital companies in
Malaysia have not kept pace with the funds raised. However, there was a surge of investment in 1993 (see Table 2 -overleaf). Information on the number and value of investments in each year was only made available from 1990 onwards. The columns towards the right hand side of Table 2 show that the majority of the investments (except for 1992) have been in laterstage (expansion) investments.
Government Incentives
The Malaysian Government has consistently expressed its desire for the existence of a thriving venture capital sector (Lin, 1994) . Growth in this field also has a strong ideological appeal, in line with the move towards privatisation.
Venture capital appears to be strongly equated in official circles with the funding and nurturing of high technology firms. The government has implemented a number of measures to encourage the growth of such firms. For example, the country's first Technology Park was established near Kuala Lumpur in 1988, significant tax incentives are available for high-tech investments and a National Action Plan for Industrial Technology Development was formulated in the sixth Five-Year Plan. In addition, the government has introduced specific incentives which benefit venture funds investing in certain types of companies.
To qualify for assistance, a venture capital company (VCC) must invest at least 70% of its fund in 'venture companies' (VCs Provided that venture funds are prepared to register with the Ministry of Finance for VCC status and submit their investments for prior approval, the incentives available are as follows:
(i) Where a VCC receives gains from the disposal of shares in an investee company, it is exempted from tax for that year of assessment; however, capital gains realised more than 3 years after a KLSE listing will not be exempt.
(ii) Where a VCC incurs a loss on the disposal of shares or the liquidation of one of its venture companies, it is allowed to set off such losses against other income, in accordance with the formula Deduction = E * I/4C, where E = expenses not normally deductible against income I = gross income arising from dividends, interest and rent C = I plus gains made from the disposal of shares in a VC.
{This formula results in a tax saving of a maximum of 25% of the value of expenses which would not normally be allowable for tax purposes.} (iii) Where the costs of managing a fund would have to be charged to investors rather than offset against profits, 'permitted expenses' -directors fees, wages and salaries, rent and other expenses -in any year of assessment can be carried forward to the following year.
The Survey Findings
The sample
By the summer of 1994, after a decade of venture capital in Malaysia, it seemed opportune to review the progress of the industry. Interviews were conducted with senior fund managers in seven major VCCs. The participants controlled 10 funds in total (see Table 3 overleaf).
The information gathered in the interviews therefore represents the opinions of a substantial majority of the venture capital community in Malaysia. The sample funds had raised over RM240m (compared to a total investment pool 2 in excess of 2 The investment pool includes funds available from Perbadanan Usahawan Nasional Berhad (PUNB), a pro-Bumiputera agency with a RM100m fund for investment in specified manufacturing sectors. However, it is questionable whether PUNB's activities can be classed as true venture capital. The equity participation is only temporary in nature and the shares are automatically sold back to the company after a specified period. The sample included one fund which was wholly foreign-owned, others with foreign equity participation (ranging from 13.3% to 49.2%) and a minority funded solely by Malaysian capital. Apart from financial institutions, the investors in the funds were mainly large private companies or government-controlled bodies. The investors rely upon the fund managers to provide specialised expertise in evaluating potential investee companies. This is a critical role, because the financial system in Malaysia is geared towards asset preservation, rather than backing high risk/high yield projects.
Investment policies and practices
A number of questions in the interview programme gathered information on investment policies and practices adopted by the fund managers.
Overall investment policy. In common with venture capitalists elsewhere, the overriding aim is to invest in companies with high growth potential 3 . However, the funds (with one exception) tended to adopt a relatively short-term perspective, Progress of investee companies. At this stage in the life of the funds, the most common response was that it was 'too soon to know' or that the investee companies were 'on plan'. However, two funds did admit that a couple of their investments were causing concern.
Exit routes/timescale. The consensus of opinion was that any investment should be realised within 1-5 years, with the funding acting as 'jet fuel' prior to flotation or acquisition by a larger company. The emphasis placed on the availability of a confirmed exit route for an investment suggests that fund managers in Malaysia are more risk-averse than elsewhere (MacMillan et al., 1985) .
The Role of Government
While it was generally accepted by the interviewees that the government had a genuine desire to encourage the growth of the venture capital industry, concern was expressed on two counts: the incentives currently offered to venture funds, and the impact of the government's efforts to encourage economic participation by the indigenous Malay community. These two factors are discussed below.
Tax incentives
Participants were asked whether their own Fund had utilised the tax incentives outlined earlier in this article. Some respondents were unaware of their existence.
Others had decided not to claim, judging that the stringent requirements to qualify as a VCC rendered the incentives virtually inaccessible.
The system of approving an investment as a qualifying VCC was criticised as cumbersome and uncertain. Currently, approval has to be granted before an investment is completed. This is unworkable, because of the pressure on the fund managers to respond quickly to propositions. Retrospective approval would prevent delay, and would also obviate the need to circulate sensitive commercial ideas around government departments. Only one interviewee had, in fact, applied to the Ministry of Finance for approval of investments 'to test the water'. The outcome was disappointing, as the Ministry failed to respond for over 8 months. It was urged that government officials should become more commercially oriented and less bureaucratic.
In essence, the incentives on offer are not being utilised. What recommendations were put forward as to how this impasse could be resolved?
To make the existing system of incentives more accessible, it was suggested that the qualification threshold for a VCC could be lowered from the present minimum (Kiernan, 1994) . However, the existence of such legislation is usually associated with the availability of attractive tax benefits for the sector.
The perception in Malaysia is that the present package of government incentives is inadequate, even if an acceptable system of defining a VCC or VC could be devised. In Singapore, for example, venture funds are allowed to write off the full capital loss arising from the sale of shares in approved companies against income, the rationale being to encourage investments that would not otherwise be made (for example, seedcorn capital where the return is unlikely to compensate for illiquidity and firm specific risk). The incentive in Singapore is more powerful than its equivalent in Malaysia, namely, the ability to offset losses on the disposal of shares up to a maximum of 25% of allowable expenses.
When interviewees were questioned about what additional support they would like to receive from government, changes to the general taxation rules applied to VCCs were often called for.
Across the globe, venture capital companies are organised under the 'everything under one roof' (single tier) or 'fund plus management company' (second tier) approaches (Ibanez, 1989) . In the second approach, the venture fund is structured as a limited partnership to which investors contribute their capital. The management of the fund is entrusted to a management company, structured as a general partnership. The limited partnership approach (which operates in, inter alia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and Singapore) is only attractive if the country's tax laws are designed to avoid double taxation on the limited and general partners (Ray, 1993) . The fund itself is not normally liable for taxation on its income or chargeable gains, and the limited and general partners should only be taxed when income or capital gains are distributed. This concession takes account of the fact that the venture fund essentially acts in an intermediary role.
In Singapore, it was acknowledged that support for innovation has to be government-led 4 . The Singapore Government recognised that venture capital, by supporting SMEs, could be a powerful mechanism for enabling the transfer of technology to take place. The principal incentive for venture funds is the granting of pioneer status for local venture capital funds, with tax exemption for up to 10 years based on the limited partnership model.
The position in Malaysia is much less clear-cut. Venture funds can structure themselves as investment holding companies, which are exempt from tax on capital gains (except for capital gains realised more than 3 years after a KLSE listing). However, when a venture fund becomes actively engaged in selling its shares in investee companies, it is deemed to be an investment trading company for tax purposes. As a consequence, 30% of profits is paid away in tax. This drain on profits was naturally a source of some resentment among the survey participants; it is difficult to provide the returns necessary to compensate investors for the risk involved, if the venture fund has to carry a tax liability comparable to that of other corporations. A number of interviewees called for the wholesale introduction of the 'Singapore model' of venture capital support. This would probably upset political sensitivities -Malaysia does not want to be seen to be following its neighbour.
Ethno-political policy
The second element of government policy which exerts a crucial influence on the venture capital sector is the official attempts to promote racial harmony. In The NEP was replaced by the National Development Policy (NDP). Specific targets for the redistribution of wealth were abandoned in the NDP. However, the overall aim of more ethnically balanced growth survived; furthermore, a number of crucial statutes and institutional obligations were not repealed -notably those concerned with the allocation of corporate equity.
The survey participants explained how these requirements were affecting their operations and commented on how the regulations might be circumvented.
Under official guidelines operated by the Ministry of International Trade and
Industry (MITI), any company with net assets above RM2.5m is obliged to relinquish 30% of its equity to Bumiputera partners. (The latter include specified financial institutions, co-operatives, individuals or 100% Bumiputera-owned companies.) If a listing on the KLSE is sought, a minimum of 15% of the company's equity has to be offered in the Initial Public Offering (IPO) and an additional 30% is distributed to Bumiputera partners nominated by the MITI (unless the 30% requirement above has already been satisfied).
The majority of the VCCs are not classed as 'Bumiputera investors'. This has serious implications for these funds, because a non-Bumiputera-owned company seeking expansion finance, with a view to achieving a KLSE listing in the near future, has a positive disincentive to use venture capital. The owners would have to dilute their control by offering shares to the venture fund, and then suffer a further dilution through the 15% IPO requirement and the additional 30% allocation for Bumiputeras. Such a company would be better advised to seek an early flotation and negotiate the distribution of equity with MITI beforehand.
Despite the NDP's abandonment of formal targets for Bumiputera participation, the interviewees did not expect that the Malaysian Government would exempt the venture capital community from this fundamental element of its social and economic policy. In this situation, the venture capitalists accept that they will need to persuade non-Bumiputera companies that the drawbacks of giving up some control to the fund (and probably further dilution on listing) are outweighed by the long term benefits of working with them. It is also acknowledged that certain choice deals from the non-Bumiputera community may gravitate towards venture funds nominated as Bumiputera by the MITI (such as PUNB).
A number of VCCs have organised their funds to qualify for Bumiputera status. In 1994, for example, MTDC mobilised another RM100m fund, which satisfies the official requirements for Bumiputera involvement. However, the MTV Fund, which MTDC operates in association with Hambrecht and Quist, can never be classed as Bumiputera because of its foreign associations.
Constraints and Opportunities
Interviewees were asked to identify the constraints and opportunities facing the industry. The points set out below summarise their opinions. Many of the issues raised in this sub-section are also subject to government influence, either directly or indirectly. The constraints include the following:
There is still a reluctance amongst SMEs to dilute ownership (quite apart from the requirements in respect of Bumiputera shareholdings); this reluctance is exacerbated by the widespread availability of non-bank funding in Malaysia, often at below commercial rates of interest. The search for deals is also highly labour-intensive and, given the lack of management depth in the BVCA, 1994) . See overleaf for more on buy-outs in Malaysia.
(viii) A number of fund managers commented on the fact that they have funds at their disposal, but they are experiencing problems in finding sufficient investment opportunities.
While the above points do not appear encouraging, it has to be stressed that the majority of participants in the survey were very positive about the prospects for their industry. The funds have made a long-term commitment to a presence in Malaysia.
[Buy-out activity in Malaysia has been very modest to date, mainly linked to the privatisation of government utilities. The survey participants did not see immediate prospects for growth, for two reasons:
Culture. The majority of independent companies and private sector conglomerates have been Chinese-controlled and subject to tight family controls.
As a race, the Chinese have traditionally sought to retain control within the family network. The prevailing culture is unlikely to change, although the next generation of managers may not be prepared to work 16-18 hours a day and insist upon total control of their businesses. With a very different lifestyle, the incoming managers may be more outward-looking, and hence prepared to entertain outside investors via venture capital or management buy-outs. One dissenting view stated that seven consecutive years of high growth had put paid to any divestment. If and when there is an economic downturn, cash-hungry conglomerates, irrespective of their ownership, would be eager to sell subsidiaries.
Legal. The Malaysian legal system is not amenable to the development of buyout activity. For example, it is not permitted to pledge the assets of the target company to secure the debt raised to fund the deal. These restrictions can be overcome, but financiers will typically have to rely upon entrepreneurs taking personal responsibility for repayment of the debt.]
Opportunities for the industry were seen in the following areas:
(i) First and foremost, the sustained growth of the economy is generating potential investee companies for venture funds. A number of interviewees pointed to the emergence of a new generation of locally-owned companies in the manufacturing sector.
Such companies have the ability to expand rapidly and earn annual profits of RM2-3m within five years, a level of progress which should enable them to achieve the minimum performance criteria for a Second Board listing.
5 All such deals are hereafter referred to as 'buy-outs'.
(ii)
Despite the fact that many Malaysian managers remain salarydriven, and reluctant to leave secure employment for risky independence, a culture of entrepreneurship is developing.
Individuals with expertise, experience and a network of contacts are increasingly willing to set up in business on their own. capital, but it may be followed by others where venture funding could be utilised. On a similar theme, many multinationals based in Malaysia have established wholly-owned subsidiaries to supply their core businesses (rather than use local sub-contractors). Over time, they may be prepared to divest these subsidiaries to local management teams via buy-outs.
Implications for other developing countries
Based on discussions with prominent members of the venture capital community in Malaysia, this article has reviewed the development of the sector over the first decade of its existence. The venture capital investment pool currently stands at over RM400m, although this has to be set alongside the approximately RM20bn credit facilities granted to SMEs by other private and public sector sources. The fund managers' current focus of activity is the funding of later-stage investments.
The provision of seedcorn capital to start-ups is rare, as is the funding of high-tech activities. The Malaysian Government has been (and remains) very keen to encourage the growth of the sector. The belief is that a thriving venture capital sector can help to maintain the remarkable growth record achieved by the Malaysian economy over recent years and also assist the move towards more balanced growth by assisting the development of SMEs.
In the light of the survey findings, the principal conclusion of this article has to be that the Malaysian Government's attempts to promote venture capital have not been a success. Within this broad conclusion, a number of more specific (often interlinked) lessons can be drawn for other developing countries. These are set out below.
The incentives offered by government need to form an integrated package. In the case of Malaysia, it is difficult to ascertain a consistent policy in response to the following questions: What exactly is the official definition of a venture capital company (VCC) or venture company (VC), and how should these terms be interpreted? And what kind of tax and financial incentives should it enjoy? The system of qualifying as a VCC was seen to be virtually unworkable. Moreover, the present package of government incentives has not been sufficiently appealing either to attract venture funds to register as a VCC or to influence their investment decisions.
The general tax regime must be designed to encourage private sector finance into venture funds, whether from savings by individuals, large local companies, multinationals, domestic financial institutions or offshore venture capital funds.
The limited partnership model has been widely adopted across the world.
Even if the general tax regime is favourable, further action by government will be required to encourage venture funds to invest in new technology. For example: specific incentives could be offered, allowing venture funds to write off losses arising from high-tech investments; another approach is to encourage publicly backed funds to support high-risk projects, perhaps alongside private sector funds. The latter approach is found in the operation of the Malaysian Technological Development Corporation, which is adopting a different investment philosophy from that of the other funds, by making smaller, higher-risk investments. This is tangible evidence of the government's commitment, but MTDC has only a limited budget and managerial resources at its disposal.
The theme of an integrated package has to be emphasised again. As Ray (1993) suggests: 'the venture capital sector can only succeed as a catalyst for the growth of high tech firms if it forms an integral component of an indigenous technological infrastructure that includes, inter alia: concentrations of skilled labour; substantial public R&D expenditure; and access to big domestic or international markets'.
Turning to more specific points: a) Attempts to combine financial and social policies can lead to market distortions. In Malaysia, it was evident that the country needs the expertise provided by foreign-backed funds, yet the Bumiputera discrimination in 
